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FROM GARNER TO GRAHAM AND BEYOND: POLICE 




At approximately noon on Saturday, August 9, 2014, an unarmed 
black teenager was shot to death by a white police officer in the St. 
Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri. The details of the shooting have 
been widely disputed. Some believe that the officer was jumped, 
beaten, and overpowered and resorted to the only measure he had 
available to defend himself from a hostile assailant. Others believe 
the officer’s use of deadly force amounted to criminal homicide. Suf-
fice it to say, popular opinion regarding the shooting is anything but 
unified. Regardless of the ultimate question of responsibility, in the 
aftermath of the shooting, media headlines, blogs, commentary, and 
social media posts tell a harrowing tale of social unrest that blazed 
not only through the streets of Ferguson, but across the entire nation:
“Ferguson Police shoots unarmed black kid 10 times”1; “An Un-
armed Teen’s Killing: Understanding the Brown Case”2; “Missouri 
crowd after shooting: ‘Kill the Police’”3; “‘Crying for Justice’: Thou-
sands Attend Michael Brown Funeral”4; “Prosecutor in Brown Case 
*Thank you first and foremost to my wonderful wife, Amy Jacob, for her enduring support and 
patience through this and all the other projects that have consumed my time for the past year. 
Her love and support are my most cherished and important lifeline. Thank you also to Professor 
Richard Wright of Chicago-Kent College of Law for his guidance and expertise in the realm of 
tort law. Finally, thank you to David Schrock, Esq. of the firm Scheldrup Blades for his perspec-
tive and expertise as an esteemed public municipality defense lawyer in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
1. SouthernGirl2, Ferguson Police Shoots Unarmed Black Kid 10 Times, 3CHICSPOLITICO
(Aug. 9, 2014), http://3chicspolitico.com/2014/08/09/ferguson-police-shoots-unarmed-black-
kid-10-times-2/.
2. Elizabeth Chuck, The Killing of an Unarmed Teen: What We know About Brown’s 
Death, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014, 5:03 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-
brown-shooting/killing-unarmed-teen-what-we-know-about-browns-death-n178696.
3. Alan Scher Zagier, Missouri Crowd After Shooting: ‘Kill the Police’, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Aug. 10, 2014, 5:44 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/missouri-crowd-after-shooting-kill-police.
4. John Brecher & Tracy Connor, ‘Crying for Justice’: Thousands Mourn Michael Brown 
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Has Deep Family Ties to Police”5; “Evidence supports officer’s ac-
count of shooting in Ferguson”6; “Doesn’t take 100 days to decide 
if murder is a crime, it takes 100 days to figure out how to tell people 
it isn’t. . . #FergusonDecision”7; “In Protests From Midwest to Both 
Coasts, Fury Boils Over”8; “I find it very disappointing that you’re 
not talking about the fact that 93% of blacks in America are killed 
by other blacks . . . Why don’t you cut it down so so many white 
police officers don’t have to be in black areas . . . The white police 
officers wouldn’t be there if you weren’t killing each other”9; “Busi-
nesses Ablaze, Bullets Fly in Mayhem After Grand Jury Decision”10;
“Violence like we saw last night cannot be repeated. Mtg w/ law 
enforcement & Guard to ensure protection of lives & property in 
days ahead.”11; “What’s happened here in the last six years? Gays 
got gay marriage, Hispanics got amnesty for illegals, and African-
Americans apparently are gonna be able to riot without anybody 
stopping them if they want to.”12
Regardless of where the truth lies, what we are left with is a dead 
body, an ostracized police officer, and an angry public, vigilant and 
bent on vengeance at one end of the spectrum, ignorant and insensi-
tive to the reality of racial tensions that continue to fester in many 
poverty-stricken urban settings on the other. We are also left with a 
question: Who is responsible for Michael Brown’s death? One obvi-
ous answer is Officer Darren Wilson. Another is the Ferguson Police 
5. Elizabeth Chuck, Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case Has Deep Family Ties to Police,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-
shooting/prosecutor-michael-brown-case-has-deep-family-ties-police-n183911.
6. Kimberly Kindy & Sari Horwitz, Evidence Supports Officer’s Account of Shooting in Fer-
guson, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-evidence-
supports-officers-account-of-shooting-in-ferguson/2014/10/22/cf38c7b4-5964-11e4-bd61-
346aee66ba29_story.html.
7. Chris Rock (@ozchrisrock), TWITTER (Nov. 24, 2014, 8:17 PM), https://twitter.com/oz-
chrisrock/status/537067600447275008.
8. John Eligon & Manny Fernandez, In Protests from Midwest to Both Coasts, Fury Boils 
Over, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/frustration-months-
in-the-making-boils-over-on-the-streets-of-ferguson.html.
9. Stephen Rex Brown, Rudy Giuliani Causes Racial Firestorm for Citing Black Crime 
Stats in Debate on Michael Brown Shooting (VIDEO), DAILY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014, 5:16 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/rudy-giuliani-firestorm-comments-mo-shooting-arti-
cle-1.2021368.
10. Ron Allen & Erin McClam, Ferguson: Businesses Ablaze, Bullets Fly in Overnight May-
hem over Grand Jury, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-
brown-shooting/ferguson-businesses-ablaze-bullets-fly-overnight-mayhem-over-grand-jury-
n255526.
11. Governor Jay Nixon (@GovJayNixon), TWITTER (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:18 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/GovJayNixon/status/537263998560129025.
12. Rush Limbaugh, Holder Goes Full-Scale Hamas: Cops Are Occupying Force in Neigh-
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Department. Yet another is Michael Brown. A fourth, society. And per-
haps a final possibility is some combination of all four. What is un-
questionable is that we, as a society, have a fundamental need to 
place blame and responsibility somewhere.
Responsibility, of course, can mean several different things.13
This paper seeks to take up the question of responsibility in the con-
text of civil liability for Michael Brown’s death14 under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“§ 1983”) pertaining to actions against government officials for 
deprivation of citizens’ civil rights.15
This paper does not presume to have complete knowledge of 
what actually happened on the afternoon of August 9, 2014, nor does 
it intend to place any judgment upon the parties, regardless of where 
fault or blame truly lies. The purpose of this article, rather, is to per-
form a modest socio-legal analysis to consider how a specific case of 
police use of force, particularly deadly force, may impact a commu-
nity, and even society at large, in controversial cases where assign-
ment of blame, or more precisely liability, is not clear. The shooting 
death of Michael Brown at the hands of the police has illuminated the 
simple truth that “justice,” as the public perceives it, is as much about 
appearance as it is about substance. Put simply, the current state of 
13. The focus of this article is on civil liability for excessive force by police officers in the 
commission of their duties. In order to hold a law enforcement agency liable for a § 1983 claim 
(as opposed to the individual officers), a plaintiff must show there was improper or insufficient 
training in the use of force that contributed to the officer’s unreasonable use of force. See, e.g.,
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989). A plaintiff may also sue the public 
municipality in which the law enforcement agency resides for allowing a custom or policy that 
fosters police misuse of force. See, e.g., MacEachern v. City of Manhattan Beach, 623 
F.Supp.2d 1092, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In addition to the three § 1983 claims against Wilson, 
the police department and the municipality, state common law claims for wrongful death, MO.
ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (West 2014), and first degree assault, MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.050 (West 
2014), could also be pleaded under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a). The state common law claims would be particularly vulnerable to summary judgment 
based on the doctrine of official immunity which shields individual officers, police agencies and 
municipalities from tort liability arising from claims related to the performance of their discretion-
ary acts, and prevents liability from attaching when an officer is acting to respond to an emer-
gency. See, e.g., Conway v. St. Louis Cty., 254 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Mo. App. E. Dist. 2008) (citing 
Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int’l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. 2006)).
14. Most states, including Missouri, have survivor statutes which allow a deceased per-
son’s estate to maintain a cause of action on behalf of the decedent/plaintiff for tort actions 
resulting in personal injury or death. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.020 (West 2014). There-
fore, any lawsuit would be brought by Brown’s next of kin, likely his mother.
15. While there had been a substantial push to hold Officer Wilson criminally responsible 
for the death of Michael Brown, a Missouri Grand Jury proceeding as well as a federal Justice 
Department investigation conducted did not result in any criminal charges against Officer Wil-
son. See Eyder Peralta & Bill Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No Charges for Officer in Michael 
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the law regulating police use of deadly force, particularly when racial 
undertones exist, does not seem just to those claiming a disparate 
impact, regardless of how the legal process may work out in practice. 
It is this perception of injustice and inequity that stokes the flames of 
public animosity and outrage over cases like that of Michael Brown.
Section I of this paper will discuss the general law and necessary 
elements for a prima facie case under § 1983, including protections 
afforded to government officials in such proceedings. Section II will 
take up an evaluation of the “objective reasonableness” standard an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in evaluating claims brought under § 
1983 for excessive force by looking at the progression of the legal 
standard employed in the two leading use of force cases, Tennessee 
v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989). Section II also dis-
cusses how a § 1983 claim would proceed under the existing stand-
ard announced in Garner and Graham, using the rough and 
developing facts of the Ferguson situation as a case study. Section III 
examines a substantive due process standard as a possible alterna-
tive to use in analyzing a § 1983 claim as advanced by Judge Friendly 
in his decision in Johnson v. Glick (1976), which was accepted as a 
possible alternative standard by Justice Blackmun in his concurring 
opinion in Graham. Finally, Section III also explores the problem with 
exclusive reliance on the Fourth Amendment, with its corresponding 
“objective reasonableness” standard, to support a claim of excessive 
force under § 1983 and how Judge Friendly’s alternative substantive 
due process standard addresses those shortcomings.
I. CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. § 1983
A civil claim against a law enforcement officer, and the agency 
employing them, for excessive force, including improper use of deadly 
force, is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .16
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In order to successfully bring a claim under § 1983 for excessive 
force, a plaintiff begins by identifying the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed upon by the challenged application of force.17 In 
an excessive force case, this will generally involve a claimed violation 
of the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.18 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.19
The term “seizure” in a policing context means more than simply 
an arrest in the traditional sense. The legal term spans a wide spec-
trum, from a routine traffic stop, to pre-arrest interrogation, to the ap-
plication of force.20 As the intrusiveness of the search or seizure 
intensifies, the scrutiny applied to whether it was reasonable intensi-
fies.21 Therefore, the highest level of scrutiny is employed in evaluat-
ing the utilization of deadly force.22
To defend against an assertion that a seizure was unreasonable 
per se, a showing of probable cause to support the seizure must be 
made.23 Typically, an officer establishes probable cause to support a 
particular search or seizure by obtaining a warrant issued by a judicial 
officer.24 However, when exigent or emergency circumstances make 
obtaining a warrant impossible, or at least impracticable, a police of-
ficer is required to have articulable probable cause in order to combat 
17. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating “[i]t is quite plain that the Fourth 
Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in . . . ‘arrests’ in traditional 
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Id.
21. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 843 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (holding “[t]he ‘totality of the circumstances’ must be examined to 
determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonableness ‘is 
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.’”)).
22. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 
F.3d 1011, 1014 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (reasoning “the use of ‘deadly force’ is only justified if the 
officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to 
the officer or others . . . the kind of surrounding circumstances that uniquely justify the use of 
deadly force—a threat of serious physical harm or worse”)).
23. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
24. Id.; Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012); Steagald v. United 
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an assertion that the seizure was per se unreasonable for the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment and § 1983.25 Probable cause exists 
when there are “facts and circumstances within the officer’s 
knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an of-
fense.”26 The Supreme Court has held that, in evaluating the totality 
of the circumstances available to the officer at the time of the search 
or seizure, the standard to be employed is that of a “prudent per-
son.”27 The officer’s subjective belief, or intent, is irrelevant to the 
analysis of probable cause.28 In situations where obtaining a warrant 
is not possible or practical, an officer may establish probable cause 
when “a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and pos-
sessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have 
reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well estab-
lished law.”29 By obtaining arguable probable cause, police officers 
are entitled to immunity from civil liability.30
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials, 
such as police officers, “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”31 Qualified 
immunity is generally sought in the form of a dispositive motion and 
is meant to prevent non-actionable claims from proceeding past the 
preliminary, dispositive stage of litigation.32 Failure to raise a defense 
of qualified immunity during the initial pleading stage, or very shortly 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding “that 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment must yield [where] exigent circumstances 
require law enforcement officers to act without delay”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Andino, 768 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
26. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
111 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); 
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175–76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
27. United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
28. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
29. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Gold v. City of Miami, 121 
F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202–03 (2d Cir. 
2001).
30. Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202–03.
31. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)).
32. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J., concur-
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thereafter, by a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment 
generally results in a presumptive waiver of the defense whereby de-
fendant will be precluded from raising it as a defense at trial or on 
appeal.33
If the officer’s conduct was clearly unreasonable, qualified im-
munity will be denied.34 In the context of an excessive force claim, the 
doctrine of qualified immunity operates “to protect officers from the 
sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.”35
“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when [he or] she 
makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably 
misapprehends the law governing the circumstances [he or] she con-
fronted.”36 It extends to a government official’s “objectively reasona-
ble mistakes, ‘regardless of whether the government official’s error is 
a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.’”37
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to 
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irrespon-
sibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”38 To resolve this 
inquiry, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz set forth a two-step in-
quiry to determine whether a government official is entitled to the pro-
tection of qualified immunity.39 In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court 
granted lower courts more flexibility “to exercise their sound discretion 
in deciding which of the two prongs . . . should be addressed first in 
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”40
In applying the Saucier test, the Eighth Circuit reasoned:
33. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Headwaters Forest Defense v. Humbold, 276 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(wherein officers used Q-tips to apply pepper spray to the eyes of nonviolent protestors and 
failed to wash it out); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (wherein police 
officer shot an unarmed, compliant suspect in the head with a less-lethal beanbag ammunition 
without warning out of a desire to immediately resolve the situation).
35. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 
919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Gallegos v. Freeman, 291 P.3d 265, 270 (Wash. App. 
Div. 1 2013) review denied, 308 P.3d 641 (Wash. 2013) (holding an officer utilizing deadly force 
to apprehend a fleeing suspect was entitled to qualified immunity).
36. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
37. Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
38. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
39. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200–01.
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In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, 
we ask (1) whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to 
the injured party, the alleged facts demonstrate that the official’s 
conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the asserted 
constitutional right is clearly established. We may address either 
question first. If either question is answered in the negative, the 
public official is entitled to qualified immunity. To determine whether 
a right is clearly established we ask whether it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.41
Once it has been determined that an officer is not entitled to qual-
ified immunity, whether the officer faces liability, in their official capac-
ity, for excessive force under § 1983 turns on whether the use of force 
was “reasonable.” The natural question that arises is, what constitutes 
a “reasonable” use of force? And, should the same standard apply to 
both the use of less-lethal force and deadly force? To explore these 
questions, we turn first to the story of Edward Garner.
II. FROM GARNER TO GRAHAM – “OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS”
AND MICHAEL BROWN
A. Tennessee v. Garner
In the 1985 case of Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court 
held that a Tennessee law stating, if upon giving lawful notice of intent 
to arrest, a criminal defendant attempts to flee, “the officer may use 
all the necessary means to effect the arrest,” was unconstitutional.42
The Court reasoned that this law violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures because it authorized the 
use of deadly force against unarmed, non-dangerous, fleeing sus-
pects.43
In Garner, two Memphis police officers, Elton Hymon and Leslie 
Wright, responded to a call for a suspected burglary at approximately 
10:45 p.m.44 Upon arriving on scene, the officers observed the sus-
pect run across the backyard, stopping and crouching at the base of 
a 6-foot tall chain link fence.45 At trial, Officer Hymon testified that he 
41. Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Brown v. City of 
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009); Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 
984, 987–88 (8th Cir. 2009).
42. Tennessee v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
43. Id.
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shone a flashlight on the suspect, later identified as Edward Garner.46
While he could not be certain, Hymon testified he was “reasonably 
sure” and “figured” that Garner was unarmed.47 Officer Hymon also 
testified that, based on what he observed, he believed the suspect 
was about five foot five inches tall, had a slight build, and was about 
seventeen or eighteen years old.48 Officer Hymon issued a verbal 
command to Garner, calling out “police halt,” and took a few steps 
towards him when Garner jumped up and began to climb the fence.49
Officer Hymon testified that he was convinced that if Garner made it 
over the fence he would escape and therefore fired one shot, fatally 
wounding him with a shot to the back of his head.50
Garner’s father brought a claim under § 1983 for violation of his 
deceased son’s civil rights with regards to the police’s use of deadly 
force.51 The Court stated that, to ascertain whether the seizure was 
reasonable, they must balance the extent of the intrusion against the 
need for it.52 In performing this calculus, the Court reasoned, “[t]he 
suspect’s fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated 
upon,” and that “[t]he use of deadly force also frustrates the interest 
of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and 
punishment.”53 On the other hand, the Court reasoned that “[a]gainst 
these interests are ranged governmental interests in effective law en-
forcement,” including the State’s assertion that “overall violence will 
be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who 
know that they may be shot if they flee.”54 In weighing these compet-
ing interests, the Court held “[w]ithout in any way disparaging the im-
portance of these [government] goals, we are not convinced that the 
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3–4. Edward Garner was in fact 15 years old and was confirmed to be unarmed 
when he was killed. Id. at 24. It was also confirmed that the house was unoccupied at the time 
of the burglary. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, City of Memphis, Tenn., 600 F.2d 52, 53 (6th 
Cir. 1979). Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on Garner’s body. Garner,
471 U.S. at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5; Garner’s father was able to bring the claim under the Tennessee survivor stat-
ute as next of kin on behalf of his deceased son. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (West 2011). 
52. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
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use of deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplish-
ing them to justify killing of nonviolent suspects.”55 The Court ulti-
mately held that, “[i]t is not better that all felony suspects die than that 
they escape,” and ruled that the Tennessee statute was thus uncon-
stitutional “insofar as it authorize[d] the use of deadly force against . . .
fleeing suspects.”56
However, the Court did not foreclose the use of deadly force to 
apprehend a fleeing suspect as being unconstitutional per se. In-
stead, the Court held that where an officer has probable cause to be-
lieve the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to 
the officer or the public at large, it is not constitutionally unreasonable 
to prevent escape by using deadly force.57 The Court clarified that, “if 
the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable 
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction 
or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be 
used if necessary to prevent escapes, and if, where feasible, some 
warning has been given.”58
Following the decision in Garner, there has been much debate 
among the lower courts as to what constitutes a “weapon”59 as well 
as when a suspect “poses a threat of serious physical harm”60 to ei-
ther the officer or the public at large.
Interestingly, the decision in Garner was not unanimous. In her 
dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor61 took issue with the majority’s 
underlying assumption that “[t]he suspect’s fundamental interest in his 
own life need not be elaborated upon.”62 Justice O’Connor argued 
that, “[t]his blithe assertion hardly provides an adequate substitute for 
the majority’s failure to acknowledge the distinctive manner in which 
55. Id. at 10 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11–12.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting a car could be a 
deadly weapon so officer using deadly force to stop the car from injuring others was reasona-
ble).
60. See, e.g., Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding an officer “had 
probable cause to believe that [a] truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to 
innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves”); contra Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 
F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding summary judgment inappropriate on a Fourth Amendment 
claim involving a fleeing suspect because the suspect’s failure to brake when an officer suddenly 
stepped in front of his just-started vehicle was not a sufficiently serious threat to justify the use 
of deadly force).
61. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Garner, 471 U.S. at 
29 (Burger J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the suspect’s interest in his life is even exposed to risk.”63 Instead, 
Justice O’Connor gave greater weight to the government’s interest in 
general crime control and deterrence reasoning “[t]he legitimate inter-
ests of the suspect in these circumstances are adequately accommo-
dated . . . [to] avoid the use of deadly force and the consequent risk 
to his life, the suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt.”64
While an entire article could be devoted to how the public reacted 
to the Court’s decision in Garner, a snapshot supports the presump-
tion that public perception following the death of Edward Garner was 
diametrically opposed to Justice O’Connor’s view of acceptable use 
of force standards.65 What was clear was that constitutional limits 
needed to be placed on police use of force, particularly when dealing 
with application of deadly force. Ironically, the bounds of those limits 
proved much more harmonious with Justice O’Connor’s view of the 
proper standard for evaluating police use of force than the majority 
opinion in Garner seemed to suggest. To explore this further, we turn 
to the case of Dethrone Graham.
B. Graham v. Connor
Four years after the decision in Garner, in the case of Graham v. 
Connor, Dethrone Graham brought an action under § 1983 against 
Officer Connor and the Charlotte Police Department claiming a viola-
tion of his civil rights based on a seizure while police investigated a 
suspected shoplifting incident.66
One important difference between the Garner and Graham cases 
is that Graham did not involve police use of deadly force. However, 
as is discussed in Section III, despite this glaring difference, the ma-
jority in Graham essentially abrogated the substantive distinction be-
tween application of non-deadly and deadly force.
On the morning of the incident in question, Graham, a diabetic, 
felt the onset of an insulin reaction and asked a friend, William Berry, 
to drive him to a nearby convenience store to buy orange juice in order 
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Welcome Curb on Deadly Force, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1985), http://www.ny-
times.com/1985/03/29/opinion/a-welcome-curb-on-deadly-force.html; Linda Greenhouse, High 
Court Limits Rights of Police to Shoot to Kill, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1985), http://www.ny-
times.com/1985/03/28/us/high-court-limits-rights-of-police-to-shoot-to-kill.html.
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to stabilize his blood sugar levels.67 Berry did as his friend asked, but 
when they arrived at the store, Graham saw that there were a number 
of customers ahead of him in the checkout line.68 Concerned over the 
delay this would cause in regulating his blood sugar, Graham rushed 
out of the store and asked Berry to take him to Berry’s house in-
stead.69
Officer Connor observed Graham hastily enter and exit the store 
and became suspicious, leading him to follow Berry’s car.70 Officer 
Connor made an investigatory stop of the vehicle and, despite Berry’s 
attempt to explain the situation, ordered both men to wait where they 
were until he could find out what occurred at the convenience store.71
When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to call for backup, Gra-
ham, who had begun to enter into diabetic shock, exited the vehicle, 
ran around it twice and collapsed on the curb, where he passed out 
briefly.72 Shortly thereafter, several other Charlotte police officers ar-
rived on scene in response to the request for backup.73
At this time, one of the officers rolled Graham onto the sidewalk 
and applied handcuffs tightly behind his back, ignoring pleas from 
Berry that Graham was diabetic and needed sugar.74 The officers dis-
missed Berry’s assertion that Graham had diabetes, with one making 
disparaging comments and suggesting instead that he was drunk.75
Several officers then proceeded to lift Graham up from behind, carry 
him to Berry’s car, and slam him face down on the hood of the vehi-
cle.76 Once he regained consciousness, Graham asked officers to 
check his wallet for a diabetic decal he carried, but this request was 
met with more disparaging remarks.77 Shortly thereafter, Officer Con-
nor received a report that Graham had not done anything wrong and 
drove him home where he released him.78 As a result of this incident, 
67. Id.
68. Id. at 388–89.
69. Id.
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Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised fore-
head, an injured shoulder, and developed a loud ringing in his right 
ear.79
Graham brought suit claiming the police used excessive force in 
making the pre-arrest seizure.80 While considering a motion for di-
rected verdict brought by the defendants, the District Court consid-
ered a four factored test to determine when the use of excessive force 
gave rise to a cause of action under § 1983.81 Those factors included: 
“(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between 
that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the 
injury inflicted; and (4) ‘[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically 
for the very purpose of causing harm.’”82 The District Court granted 
Defendants’ motion for directed verdict finding that the amount of 
force applied by the officers was “appropriate under the circum-
stances” and was applied in “good faith.”83
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling.84 The majority held that the 
District Court had applied the correct standard in assessing peti-
tioner’s excessive force claim and adopting the four-factored test ap-
plied by the District Court as generally applicable to all claims of 
excessive force.85 The dissenting judge argued that, based on the de-
cisions of Terry v. Ohio86 and Tennessee v. Garner, excessive force 
claims arising under the Fourth Amendment were appropriately ex-
amined under the “objective reasonableness” standard.87
79. Id. at 390.
80. Id. at 388.
81. Id. at 390.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 390–91.
84. Id. at 391.
85. Id. This four-factored test originated from Judge Friendly in his opinion in Johnson v. 
Glick wherein Judge Friendly looked to neither the Fourth nor Eighth Amendments but to sub-
stantive due process in evaluating excessive force claims holding, “quite apart from any ‘spe-
cific’ of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a 
suspect of liberty without due process of law.” 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Judge Friendly used the four-factored test to guide the Court in deter-
mining “whether the constitutional line has been crossed” by the particular use of force. Id. at 
1033.
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.88 While this 
outcome certainly seems appropriate, the larger ramifications of the 
majority’s reasoning have inflicted a resounding blow on future liti-
gants’ ability to challenge police use of force, particularly in claims 
involving deadly force.
In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist built off of the dissent-
ing opinion that he supported in Garner, holding that:
[T]he test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application . . . The “reasonableness” of a particular use 
of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . The 
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that 
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
Moreover, in response to the District Court and Court of Appeals 
employing a substantive due process analysis, looking in part to the 
subjective motivations and intentions of the officer as well as to the 
extent of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, the Court announced that 
the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective 
one.89 The majority wrote, “the question is whether the officer’s ac-
tions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation.”90 The Court further reasoned that even an “officer’s evil 
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an ob-
jectively reasonable use of force.”91
This statement is particularly troubling and, as is discussed in 
Section III, the “objective reasonableness” standard announced by 
the Court in Graham has become a defacto shield for law enforcement 
who are afforded great deference in determining when a particular 
use of force is “objectively reasonable” in the circumstances pre-
sented. While Graham presented a fairly easy case, that is police had 
no objectively reasonable basis for utilizing any degree of force, this 
standard has proved quite problematic in “close call” cases involving 
police utilization of deadly force against suspects who arguably pose 
a threat of serious harm to officers or the public at large.
88. Id.
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In his concurring opinion in Graham, Justice Blackmun92 rea-
soned that, while he agreed with the Court’s finding that “the Fourth 
Amendment is the primary tool for analyzing claims of excessive force 
in the prearrest context,” he saw, “no reason for the Court to find it 
necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest excessive force 
claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than 
under a substantive due process standard.”93 Justice Blackmun fur-
ther stated he did not agree that the Court’s prior decision in Garner
supported such a reading.94 Acknowledging that reliance on the 
Fourth Amendment was a wise choice for Graham, Justice Blackmun 
explained, “I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise sub-
stantive due process concerns.”95 However, he concluded that “until I 
am faced with a case in which that question is squarely raised . . . I 
do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analysis 
in prearrest cases.”96
Justice Blackmun likely asserted that the use of the Fourth 
Amendment was a wise choice for Graham because it was obvious, 
using an “objective reasonableness” standard, that the officers’ use 
of force against a non-violent and, in fact, innocent individual in the 
midst of a diabetic seizure was unreasonable. Looking to the subjec-
tive motivations and intentions of the officers, whether they were act-
ing in “good faith” and whether there was a less harmful alternative 
available, does not matter when it is obvious that the use of force is 
objectively unreasonable. Nothing in the circumstances that the police 
found themselves in would lead a reasonable officer to believe any 
degree of force was reasonable or necessary in detaining Graham. 
The Brown case, on the other hand, falls more in the category of a 
“close call” where it is not so clear what amount of force was reason-
able, or more precisely necessary, to end the threat that Brown 
posed, whatever that threat may have been.
Cases like the shooting death of Michael Brown may be exactly 
the sort of case that Justice Blackmun was eluding to when he refused 
to join the majority in foreclosing the use of a substantive due process 
92. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the concurrence. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 399–400.
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analysis for evaluating police use of force. However, the remainder of 
Section II will address how a § 1983 claim would proceed under the 
existing precedents of Garner and Graham, with the corresponding 
“objective reasonableness” standard. Section III will then contrast this 
with how the same case may unfold under a substantive due process 
evaluation, initially presented by Judge Friendly in his 1976 decision 
in Johnson v. Glick and which Justice Blackmun would have left open 
as a possible alternative pathway to an actionable § 1983 claim in 
Graham.
C. Garner, Graham, and Michael Brown
Under the existing law, to commence an action against Officer 
Wilson, Brown’s mother would file a Complaint with the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri claiming a violation 
of her deceased son’s civil rights. The claim would be brought pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of Brown’s right to be 
“secure in [his] person[] . . . from unreasonable . . . seizures” under 
the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.97
Missouri law regulating police use of deadly force affords law en-
forcement officers the full grant of authority allowable under Garner
and Graham.98 Specifically, the state statute authorizes police to use 
deadly force “in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from 
custody . . . when [the officer] reasonably believes . . . [it] is immedi-
ately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that 
the person to be arrested has committed or attempted to commit a 
felony . . . or may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical 
injury unless arrested without delay.”99
Based on the decision in Graham, a purely objective perspective 
would be employed in evaluating the reasonableness of Officer Wil-
son’s decision to use deadly force.100 Emphasizing this purely objec-
tive perspective, the Graham Court reiterated, “subjective concepts 
like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.”101 Sub-
sequent jurisprudence in the area of police excessive force in the 
97. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
98. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.046 (West 2014).
99. Id.
100. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
101. Id. at 399. The Court did, however, note that “in assessing the credibility of an officer’s 
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wake of Graham has established that, where “potential danger, emer-
gency conditions or other exigent circumstances are present,” the 
“standard of reasonableness is comparatively generous to the po-
lice.”102 While the case law does not make clear what constitutes a 
“potential danger,” whether a lower court is addressing substantive 
liability or qualified immunity, “the Supreme Court intends to surround 
the police who make . . . on-the-spot choices in dangerous situations 
with a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases.”103
Given this extremely deferential posture, depending on the evi-
dence fleshed out during initial discovery, it is very likely that the § 
1983 claim brought on behalf of Michael Brown, under the current 
standard, would result in summary judgment in favor of Officer Wilson 
either on the issue of qualified immunity or substantive liability. This 
is particularly true if there is no credible evidence supporting the the-
ory that Brown was attempting to surrender when he was shot to 
death.104
Looking to what appear to be the undisputed facts, Michael 
Brown and Dorian Johnson, ages eighteen and twenty-two respec-
tively, visited Ferguson Market and Liquor a little before noon and
stole a pack of cigarillos.105 Immediately after the two young men left 
the liquor store, a 911 call was placed to report the theft and, within 
minutes, a police dispatcher relayed information to officers on duty 
that the suspects of an alleged theft were walking northbound on a 
road running adjacent to the liquor store.106 Shortly thereafter, while 
patrolling in his squad car, Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson en-
countered Brown and Johnson walking in the middle of the road and 
ordered them to get out of the street.107 While Wilson had not initially 
made contact with Brown and Johnson because of the reported theft, 
soon after the initial encounter, he recognized that the young men 
matched the description relayed by dispatch as being involved in a 
with other factors, evidence that the officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.” Id. at 
399 n.12; see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
102. Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994). 
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Based on the outcome of the Missouri Grand Jury Indictment proceedings and the De-
partment of Justice investigation into the shooting, it is very unlikely that such evidence can be 
marshaled. See Peralta & Chappell, supra note 15.
105. Rachel Clarke & Christopher Lett, What Happened when Michael Brown Met Officer 








      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 178 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
12 JACOB FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:26 AM
342 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
suspected theft and reengaged them.108 A dispute arose that pro-
gressed into a physical altercation between Brown and Wilson includ-
ing wrestling through the window of Wilson’s squad car.109 As the two 
wrestled, a shot was fired from Wilson’s gun from within the vehicle 
that struck Brown and caused him to flee from the immediate vicinity 
of the vehicle.110 Wilson immediately exited his vehicle, issued at least 
one verbal command, and shortly thereafter, Brown, who was later 
confirmed to be unarmed, was shot to death by Wilson.111 An autopsy 
report revealed that Brown had been shot at least six times, including 
gunshot wounds to his right hand, arm, chest, and head.112 The au-
topsy further indicated that Brown sustained a close proximity gun-
shot wound to his right hand, indicative of a struggle over Officer 
Wilson’s gun while the two wrestled through the window of Wilson’s 
vehicle.113 Beyond these salient facts, the stories of the respective 
parties, and those reverberating through American mainstream and 
underground media outlets, substantially diverge.114
For the purposes of this article, a few factual assumptions are 
made. It is assumed that Officer Wilson did not confront Brown and 
108. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V) at 208–09, State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (Mo. Cir. 
Ct. Sept. 10, 2014) (transcript at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1370494-grand-
jury-volume-5.html).
109. Clarke, supra note 105.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck At 
Least 6 Times, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-
brown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at-least-6-times.html?_r=0; ST. LOUIS CTY., OFFICE OF THE
MED. EXAM’R, POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION (2014).
113. Christine Byers, Official Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Had Close-Range Wound to 
his Hand, Marijuana in System, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.stlto-
day.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/official-autopsy-shows-michael-brown-had-close-range-
wound-to/article_e98a4ce0-c284-57c9-9882-3fb7df75fef6.html; POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION,
supra note 112. 
114. See supra Introduction. In his Grand Jury testimony, Dorian Johnson painted Wilson 
as the aggressor stating he initiated the physical altercation and shot Brown to death when 
Brown was attempting to surrender. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume IV) at 45–54, 100–23, 
State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2014) (transcript at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-assets/grand-jury-testi-
mony.pdf). Wilson, on the other hand, testified that Brown was the aggressor, asserting Brown 
attacked him, began punching him in the face and was overpowering him while wrestling for his 
gun, leaving him no choice but to fire his weapon. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V), supra 
note 108, at 208–36. Wilson indicated that even without Brown grabbing for his gun, he was 
authorized to use deadly force when Brown was punching him in his face. Id. at 236–37. Wilson
described his need in firing the final fatal shots, stating Brown stopped fleeing, turned around 
and charged at him. Id. at 234. Wilson also explained his reasoning for pursuing Brown stating, 
“what would stop him from doing what he has just did to me to [another officer] or worse, knowing 
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Johnson with the intent of murdering Brown. It is also assumed that 
Officer Wilson was acting in furtherance of his duties as a law en-
forcement officer when he and Brown became engaged in a physical 
altercation. Finally, it is assumed that the forensic evidence offered 
will support that Brown and Wilson wrestled through the window of 
Wilson’s squad car, including wrestling over Wilson’s gun once it was 
drawn, causing the close proximity gunshot wound to Brown’s right 
hand. At that point, the uncontested facts support that Brown fled from 
the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s squad car before the fatal shots 
were fired.
At this point, three possibilities emerge. One, Brown turned and 
attempted to surrender when Wilson shot and killed him. Two, Brown 
turned and charged toward Wilson when Wilson shot and killed him. 
Or three, Brown turned and did not either immediately charge toward 
Wilson or attempt to surrender. The first scenario presents an easy 
case, whereby assessment of liability under the “objective reasona-
bleness” standard would be straightforward. No reasonable officer 
could believe that an unarmed suspect who is trying to surrender 
poses a serious risk of harm to either the officer or the public such 
that use of deadly force would be warranted. The second and espe-
cially the third scenarios seem to fall in what Justice Kennedy dubbed 
the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,”115 that the 
“objective reasonableness” standard is ill-suited to address. Is an un-
armed suspect, who’s only “weapon” is his body, a serious enough 
threat to an officer’s safety to justify the use of deadly force? Under 
the second scenario, does an unarmed suspect “charging” at an of-
ficer elevate the risk of serious harm such that deadly force is appro-
priate? Under the third scenario, if the suspect is not charging towards 
the officer, but also is not heeding orders to surrender, does that jus-
tify use of deadly force? Would some form of less-lethal force have 
been more appropriate?
As the Graham court suggests, the deference given to police in 
utilization of force is meant to cast a “wide zone of protection in close 
cases,” which will typically manifest itself in a grant of qualified im-
munity, unless their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
115. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 
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known.”116 Of course, what is “clearly established” is a matter of per-
spective and the deferential posture afforded to police tends to tip this 
balance in favor of immunity for police in close cases.
However, even if the case survived summary judgment, the court 
must instruct the jury to determine whether the officer’s use of force 
was “objectively reasonable” by balancing “the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against 
the interests of the police in making the arrest in the particular manner 
it was made.117 Here, that of course entails utilization of deadly force. 
As the Court in Graham announced:
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in 
the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. 
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judg-
ments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particu-
lar situation.118
Given this deferential posture, the Court has held that the jury 
should be instructed to give careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances of the case, “including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or at-
tempting to evade arrest by flight.”119 These factors must be consid-
ered “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 
regard to underlying intent or motivation.”120 Any “evil intentions” mo-
tivating an officer’s objectively reasonable use of force “will not make 
a Fourth Amendment violation.”121
A case somewhat similar to the fact pattern in the Brown case 
which applied this standard is Brosseau v. Haugen.122 In Brosseau,
the Supreme Court addressed a § 1983 claim involving police use of 
deadly force wherein a police officer shot an unarmed suspect in the 
back while trying to evade arrest. While on first blush, the Court’s prior 
decision in Garner would seem to render such use of force patently 
116. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)).
117. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
118. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 397.
121. Id.
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unconstitutional, the Court found that Haugen, the suspect, pos-
sessed a “weapon,” his vehicle, and posed a threat of “serious harm” 
to officers and the public at large.123 Therefore, the Court decided that 
qualified immunity prevented the claim from even progressing past 
the dispositive stage, thus negating the need to even reach the ques-
tion of whether the officer’s use of deadly force was “objectively rea-
sonable.”
As the Court discussed, “[we] ask whether, at the time of [the 
officer’s] actions, it was ‘clearly established’ in this more ‘particular-
ized’ sense that she was violating Haugen’s Fourth Amendment 
right.”124 In reaching their decision, the Court noted that the parties 
pointed to a handful of cases “relevant to the ‘situation [Officer 
Brosseau] confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on 
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the imme-
diate area are at risk from that flight.”125 Specifically, Officer Bros-
seau’s representatives pointed to Cole v. Bone and Smith v. 
Freland126
In Cole and Smith, no Fourth Amendment violations were found 
when an officer shot a fleeing suspect who “presented a risk to oth-
ers.”127 Specifically, in Cole officers engaged in a high speed chase 
of a suspect driving an eighteen wheel tractor-trailer recklessly, refus-
ing to yield to roadblocks, ramming police cars, and forcing civilian 
motorists off of the roadway, resulting in police shooting the suspect 
in the head, killing him, to end the pursuit.128 Likewise, in Smith the 
officer engaged in a car chase, which appeared to be at an end when 
the officer cornered the suspect at the back of a dead-end residential 
street.129 However, the suspect freed his car and began speeding 
down the street at which point the officer shot and killed the sus-
pect.130 The officer’s use of deadly force was found to be reasonable, 
and therefore not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because the 
123. Id. at 200.
124. Id. at 199–200 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
125. Id. at 200.
126. Id.
127. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the officer “had probable 
cause to believe that the [suspect’s] truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to 
innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves.”); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 
(6th Cir. 1992) (noting “a car can be a deadly weapon” and holding the officer’s decision to use 
deadly force to stop the car from possibly injuring others was reasonable).
128. Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330–31. 
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suspect “had proven he would do almost anything to avoid capture” 
and posed a serious threat to the other officers at the end of the 
street.131
On the other hand, Haugen pointed to Estate of Starks v. Enyart
“where the court found summary judgment inappropriate on a Fourth 
Amendment claim involving a fleeing suspect.”132 The Starks court
held that the threat created by the fleeing suspect’s failure to brake 
when an officer suddenly stepped in front of his just-started car was 
not a sufficiently grave threat to justify the use of deadly force.133
Taken together, the court in Brosseau v. Haugen reasoned, the 
three cases “undoubtedly show that this area is one in which the result 
depends very much on the facts of each case. None of them squarely 
governs the case here; they do suggest that Brosseau’s actions fell 
in the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.’”134 The 
court definitively held, however, that these cases “by no means 
‘clearly establish’ that Brosseau’s conduct violated the Fourth Amend-
ment” and therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals find-
ing that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity for her use of 
deadly force in shooting Haugen in the back as he attempted to drive 
away.135
Applying the holding and reasoning of Brosseau to the case of 
Michael Brown, if the evidence shows that Officer Wilson and Brown 
initially wrestled over Wilson’s gun, the requirement that Wilson rea-
sonably believed deadly force was necessary given the possible dan-
ger Brown continued to pose after he fled from the immediate vicinity 
of the vehicle is likely satisfied. Such apprehension would combat any 
assertion by Brown’s representatives that Wilson’s conduct violated a 
“clearly established” constitutional protection because there is no 
such protection afforded to citizens to resist arrest by flight once an 
officer has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous. The fact 
that Brown wrestled with a police officer over his firearm would pro-
vide the ongoing threat of serious harm that the court found to be a 
prerequisite to a finding of “objective reasonableness” in Graham and
subsequently elaborated upon in Brosseau. As Officer Wilson testified 
during his Grand Jury testimony “what would stop him from doing 
 131. Id.
 132. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004). 
 133. Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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what he has just did to me to [another officer] or worse, knowing he 
has already done it to one cop.”136 Certainly, if Brown’s representa-
tives could prove that Brown’s wrestling over the gun was merely 
done in self-defense, that would not provide sufficient grounds for Of-
ficer Wilson to believe that Brown posed a threat of serious harm to 
himself or others. However, based on the outcome of the Grand Jury 
proceedings and Justice Department investigations, the likelihood of 
Brown’s representatives marshaling such evidence is quite low.
Instead, under the existing law, as Justice O’Conner suggested 
in her dissenting opinion in Garner, which Justice Rehnquist joined 
and built upon in his majority opinion in Graham, Brown essentially 
assumed the risk of deadly force by committing a violent felony, wres-
tling with Wilson over his gun, and thereafter forfeited any Fourth 
Amendment interest he had to resist arrest by flight or non-deadly 
force. Therefore, Wilson’s use of deadly force, did not violate a 
“clearly established” constitutional protection such that qualified im-
munity would likely be granted because Brown arguably posed a risk 
of serious harm, even after he fled from the immediate vicinity of Wil-
son’s vehicle. Moreover, even if qualified immunity were not granted, 
Wilson’s use of deadly force would likely be found to be “objectively 
reasonable” in the circumstances because of the ongoing threat 
Brown posed, regardless of any underlying subjective motivations or 
intentions that operated at the time the fatal shots were fired.
The force employed by Wilson was no more unreasonable than 
the force applied in Brosseau, Cole or Smith, where the parties did 
not dispute that the respective suspects were attempting to flee when 
deadly force was employed. Here, the facts are unclear as to whether 
Brown was attempting to flee or was continuing to resist arrest by 
force when he was shot to death. Wilson’s representatives would ar-
gue that Brown’s recklessness and proclivity to violence, exhibited by 
his attempting to wrestle a gun away from a police officer, created a 
serious risk of harm to Wilson and others that continued to exist even 
once Brown fled from the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s vehicle. 
Therefore, Wilson’s decision to employ deadly force to neutralize that 
threat did not violate a “clearly established” constitutional protection, 
as Brown had assumed the risk associated with the use of deadly 
force and effectively waived any protection he would otherwise have 
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had; thus, the use of force was “objectively reasonable” in the circum-
stances.
Given the current state of the law and the apparently uncontested 
facts of the Brown case, it is very difficult to see a § 1983 claim sur-
viving summary judgment. Whether or not that is the “right” outcome 
in this case is immaterial to this discussion. What is material, however, 
is how that conclusion is reached. By relying solely on the “objective 
reasonableness” standard to justify police use of deadly force to shoot 
and kill an unarmed suspect, the law ignores a key question that any 
lay person would ask. Was there anything else that could have been 
done to avoid the loss of life? Maybe, and maybe not. But that ques-
tion ought to be asked and exclusive reliance on the lens of “objective
reasonableness” does not allow it to be.
III. IS THERE ANOTHER WAY?
A possible alternative to the narrow perspective that the “objec-
tive reasonableness” standard affords was addressed by Judge 
Henry Friendly sitting for the Second Circuit in the 1976 case Johnson 
v. Glick. In Glick, Judge Friendly addressed the validity of a § 1983 
claim brought by a prisoner against the warden and a guard at a de-
tention facility alleging the guard made an unprovoked attack on him 
and detained him in a holding cell for two hours before returning him 
to his cell.137 When the prisoner requested medical attention, the 
guard held him in his cell for another two hours before permitting him 
to see a doctor.138 Struggling to apply the Eighth Amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment to the case before him, 
Judge Friendly looked instead to a prior case decided by the Second 
Circuit that had invoked a substantive due process analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the constitutional basis for a § 1983 
claim.139 The trouble, Judge Friendly reasoned, with applying the 
Eighth Amendment to the case was twofold.
First, he recognized that a single act by a rogue prison guard did 
not present the type of institutional abuse that is typically required to 
satisfy a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment because it was done in accordance with some existing 
137. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1973).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1031; see also Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1973) (wherein 
Judge Knapp stated in dictum “[w]e assume that brutal police conduct violates a right guaran-
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institutional policy or procedure.140 Judge Friendly stated that, “[t]he 
thread common to all these cases is that ‘punishment’ has been de-
liberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose, with the 
apparent authorization of high prison officials charged by the state 
with responsibility for care, control, and discipline of prisoners.”141 In
contrast, Judge Friendly suggested that, while certainly cruel and 
hopefully unusual, a spontaneous act by a prison guard did not fit with 
any ordinary meaning of “punishment.”142 Second, Judge Friendly ex-
pressed that “[w]e have considerable doubt that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause is properly applicable at all until after conviction 
and sentence.”143 However, “it would be absurd,” Judge Friendly ob-
served, “to hold that a pre-trial detainee has less constitutional 
protection against acts of prison guards than one who has been 
convicted.”144
To resolve these problems with applying the Eighth Amendment 
to a case where it appeared obvious that justice demanded liability be 
imposed, Judge Friendly held, “both before and after sentence, con-
stitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct 
violating specific command of the Eighth Amendment or . . . the 
Fourth.”145 Instead, Judge Friendly suggested, “Rochin v. California146
must stand for the proposition that, quite apart from any ‘specific’ of 
the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement offic-
ers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.”147
In Rochin – the Supreme Court decision Judge Friendly relies 
upon as the basis for applying a substantive due process analysis to 
a § 1983 claim – the Court elaborated upon the purpose of the Due 
Process Clause stating:






146. Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (in addressing the constitutionality 
of a conviction based on coercion, Justice Frankfurter held “[i]t has long since ceased to be true 
that due process of law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible 
evidence is obtained”).
147. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170–71)); see also Collum v. Butler, 
421 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he force used by the officers was unreasonable and 
unnecessary to restrain the plaintiff thus violating his constitutional right of due process.”); Tol-
bert v. Bragan, 451 F.2d 1020, 1020 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Severe physical abuse of prisoners by 
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Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause ‘inescapa-
bly imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the 
whole course of the proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether 
they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express 
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward 
those charged with the most heinous offenses.’. . . Due process of 
law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those 
personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for 
the Court, are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental’ or are ‘implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.’148
Recognizing that a test was needed to gauge when an intentional 
use of force rose to the level of a constitutional infringement, Judge 
Friendly suggested four factors for courts to consider in Glick.149
Those factors included, “the need for the application of force, the re-
lationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, 
the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm.”150
Ultimately, Judge Friendly found that in applying the four factored 
test he had announced, the dismissal of Johnson’s complaint against 
the officer, Fuller, for excessive force was not appropriate and re-
versed the lower court’s ruling with respect to Officer Fuller.
While substantive due process is a hotly contested area of con-
stitutional law, even the most conservative approaches to a substan-
tive application of the Due Process Clause have recognized that the 
core individual rights protected by the Constitution generally and the 
Due Process Clause specifically are “life, liberty, [and] property.”151 It 
is difficult to imagine a more valuable individual right than the right to 
one’s own life. Certainly, this is something that has traditionally been 
afforded great protection by the laws and courts of this country.
Turning to the case of Michael Brown, applying the four-factored 
substantive due process test employed by Judge Friendly in Glick, a 
148. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
149. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
150. Id.
151. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) 
(wherein Justice Scalia announced “the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments . . . focus . . . on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is 
taken”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have held 
repeatedly, in cases the Court today does not overrule, that only fundamental rights qualify for 
this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protection—that is, rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition’ such as the right to life, liberty, or property as expressly stated in 
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much different perspective emerges in evaluating Officer Wilson’s 
conduct, specifically his decision to employ deadly force, than exists 
under an “objective reasonableness” approach. This difference in per-
spective is illuminated by looking to each of Judge Friendly’s factors 
in turn:
(1) The need for the application of force:
This factor changes the perception of the officer’s use of force. 
Instead of asking whether the officer’s use of force was “objectively 
reasonable,” the court inquires whether the use of force was neces-
sary. Depending on what the evidence bears as to whether Brown or 
Officer Wilson was the instigator of the initial physical altercation, the 
need for the officer to employ some amount of force would be a jury 
question. That is, if Wilson instigated the altercation, forcing Brown to 
take action merely in self-defense, then the initial need for any amount 
of force would be doubtful and this factor may be dispositive in favor 
of Brown.152
On the other hand, if the evidence bears out that Brown insti-
gated the physical altercation, Wilson would of course be within his 
rights to respond with some level of force. However, whether any level 
of force is necessary is only the first step in the equation. The rela-
tionship between the need for some amount of force and the amount
of force actually employed (less-lethal versus deadly force) is taken 
up in Judge Friendly’s second factor.
(2)The relationship between the need and the amount of force 
that was used:
Even if we assume some level of force was justified, either be-
cause Brown instigated the physical altercation or the physical alter-
cation derived mutually from both parties, the relationship between 
the need for some level of force and the amount of force actually em-
ployed must coincide. Therefore, if it is assumed that there was a 
physical struggle through the window of Wilson’s car over his gun, 
once a shot was fired and Brown fled from the immediate vicinity of 
the vehicle, the jury would need to determine whether the continued 
need for some level of force to detain Brown and the amount of force 
152. Even under an “objective reasonableness” analysis, in such easy cases where no 
amount of force was reasonable or necessary, the underlying constitutional hook, Fourth 
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actually used, shooting Brown five more times, was appropriate in the 
circumstances to secure Wilson’s objective of detaining Brown.
This crucial step, examining the relationship between the need 
for the use of force and the amount of force actually used, completely 
shifts the focus of the analysis from what could be construed as a 
reasonable amount of force in the circumstances to what was the nec-
essary amount of force in the particular circumstance. While it may 
have been “objectively reasonable,” under the deferential “objective 
reasonableness” approach, for Wilson to use deadly force to detain 
Brown after he exhibited a threat of serious harm to Wilson and others 
by wrestling with him over his gun,153 it is less clear whether that same 
level of force was necessary.
Judge Friendly’s model allows the court and jury to consider the 
basic question of whether there was something else Officer Wilson 
could have done to attain his objective other than resorting to deadly 
force. This would be a question of fact for the fact-finder to determine 
upon consideration of all of the available evidence, but it is plausible 
for Brown’s representatives to argue that Wilson had alternatives to 
the utilization of deadly force. Could he have remained in his squad 
car until backup arrived?154 Could he have used less lethal force, such 
as a baton or pepper spray,155 to detain Brown? Should departmental 
practices have required that Wilson carry a Taser or beanbag projec-
tile at all times while on duty as an alternative, less-lethal force option 
to detain hostile suspects where use of deadly force can be avoided? 
While the answers to these questions are not clear and would need 
to be resolved through the adversarial process, the mere fact of ask-
ing whether there was anything that could have been done differently 
would, from a sociological perspective, help allay the inherent cold-
ness and sense of institutionalized inequity and indifference that at-
taches to a justification of “objective reasonableness” for the loss of 
life.
153. Just as the Court found existed in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004); Cole 
v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); and Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 
1992). See supra Section II.C.
154. Wilson testified that he radioed for backup prior to the physical altercation with Brown 
and that additional officers arrived on scene no more than a minute after the fatal shots were 
fired. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V), supra note 108, at 208–36.
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(3)The extent of injury inflicted:
Application of this factor to the use of deadly force is, of course, 
quite simple. The loss of life is the most serious injury a person can 
sustain. Despite its simple application in the case of Michael Brown, 
this factor serves the important function of placing the sanctity of life 
at the forefront of the analysis in police use of deadly force cases. To 
pass constitutional muster under a substantive due process analysis, 
the officer must account for the necessity of their use of force in rela-
tion to the injury ultimately suffered by the plaintiff, in this case, death. 
Therefore, Officer Wilson would need to establish that his decision to
use deadly force, with the foreseeable consequence of the suspect’s 
death, was necessary and was the only reasonable option available 
to him to protect his own life or the life of others in order to justify the 
use of deadly force. This again infers that the officer has exhausted 
any alternative, less-lethal force options that could have been utilized 
to obtain the same result, in this case, detaining Brown. Of course, as 
with civilian use of deadly force in self-defense or defense of others, 
this factor is not dispositive if an officer reasonably misapprehends a 
serious threat to their life or the life of another.156 However, an officer’s 
reasonable misapprehension of the situation they were confronted 
with would not shield the officer from civil liability, as would generally 
be the case under an “objective reasonableness” approach,157 if, on 
balance, the four-factored substantive due process test weighs in fa-
vor of imposing liability.
This leads back to the discussion under the second factor of 
Judge Friendly’s analysis, whether the amount of force used was nec-
essary. If there is any doubt about that factor, coupled with this third 
factor, the extent of injury inflicted, in this case death, then the two 
factors weigh heavily in favor of imposing civil liability under a sub-
stantive due process approach. This approach still shields individual 
officers who are forced to make split-second decisions in hostile situ-
ations, from criminal responsibility for such decisions. However, po-
lice agencies, responsible for training, supervising and equipping 
officers in the field, would be forced to take responsibility for officers’ 
faulty decisions to resort to the use of deadly force when it is not 
deemed to be necessary in the circumstances.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 65, 76 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
157. See, e.g., Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. 
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(4)Whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain 
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very pur-
pose of causing harm.
This factor is somewhat problematic because it seems to infer 
that for liability to attach under a substantive due process analysis,
the officer’s conduct had to be “malicious and sadistic.” This amounts 
essentially to a criminal law standard of proof. In the case of Brown, 
this would be particularly problematic because a Grand Jury declined 
to bring criminal charges against Wilson. This suggests that the evi-
dence did not bear out that Wilson’s use of deadly force was “mali-
cious and sadistic.” However, this factor must be considered in the 
context of the other three factors in considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances. That is, if the first three factors heavily favor imposing 
liability, it is not necessary to show that the use of force was “sadistic 
or malicious.” Even if the use of force was applied “in good faith,” if it 
was not necessary, the need for the use of some level of force was 
substantially out of proportion to the amount of force actually em-
ployed, and the extent of the injury to the plaintiff was severe, liability 
would still attach.
However, if the need for the use of some level of force is appar-
ent, but the officer’s use of force was “sadistic and malicious” (e.g. in 
bad faith with an intent to harm), then liability would also attach. An 
example of such a scenario can be envisioned in the present case. If 
it is assumed that Wilson did have a legitimate need to employ deadly 
force in order to detain Brown, but he fired an extra three or four 
rounds because he was angry over the initial confrontation and 
wanted to kill rather than merely detain Brown, liability would attach 
based on this factor.
This factor further highlights the difference between the “objec-
tive reasonableness” standard and the substantive due process 
standard. Under the “objective reasonableness” standard, in the fore-
going hypothetical, Wilson’s subjective motivations or evil intentions 
in firing the extra three or four rounds would be irrelevant so long as 
a reasonable officer in the circumstances would believe the use of 
deadly force was reasonable in the circumstances.158 Courts have 
consistently held that, where an officer reasonably perceives, even if
this turns out to be a misperception in hindsight, a threat of serious
harm to other officers or the public, shooting with the intention to kill 
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does not offend constitutional principles.159 Therefore, an officer’s use 
of lethal force would pass constitutional muster under an “objective 
reasonableness” standard where the officer can articulate probable 
cause to believe the suspect posed a serious risk of harm to other 
officers or the public without inquiring as to the officer’s subjective 
intentions when the fatal shots were fired. Under Judge Friendly’s ru-
bric, such subjective intentions or motivations are relevant, and in fact 
central, to the consideration of whether the use of deadly force was 
appropriate in the circumstances.
Ultimately, it would be left up to the finder of fact to determine 
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the four factors 
of Judge Friendly’s subjective due process analysis supported Officer 
Wilson’s decision to use deadly force or whether such force was un-
necessary such that liability would attach. However, it is clear that this 
analysis provides much greater consideration and protection to the 
individual’s fundamental interest in their own life and to the societal 
interest in the sanctity of all human life. If at the end of the presenta-
tion of evidence, a jury found that there was simply nothing else Of-
ficer Wilson could have reasonably done differently in the 
circumstances he encountered, no liability would attach to his deci-
sion to employ deadly force. But, the mere fact that such inquiry is 
made goes to the very question that the “objective reasonableness” 
standard fails to address to the detriment of those touched most 
closely by the death of Michael Brown: “Wasn’t there anything else 
that could’ve been done?”
159. See, e.g., Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. Appx. 378, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2014) (un-
published) (detective’s use of deadly force in fatally shooting suspect was objectively reasona-
ble, and thus did not violate Fourth Amendment; although there was no weapon found in 
suspect’s vicinity, detective’s account of the events, corroborated by affidavits of others at the 
scene, indicated that suspect failed to comply with detective’s instructions and appeared to be 
reaching for a weapon before detective shot him, and there was no indication that suspect was 
fleeing at the time he was shot); Melvin v. Karman, 550 Fed. Appx. 218, 219 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(unpublished) (detectives decision to shoot and kill a fifteen year old boy in his bedroom was 
objectively reasonable where the boy wielded a knife, failed to heed the officers’ instructions to 
drop the knife, and approached the officers wielding the knife); Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 
585 F.3d 901, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2009); Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 404–
05 (6th Cir. 2007) (where a police sniper fired two shots, fatally wounding the suspect, did not 
amount to excessive force because the officer reasonably believed the suspect holding a rifle 
at waist level posed a risk of significant harm to approaching officers); contra Weiland v. Palm 
Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 13-14396, 2015 WL 4098270, at *8 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding 
allegations that deputies responding to 911 call shot caller’s son without warning when he did 
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B. Seeking “Justice” for Ferguson
As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Graham,
“[while] I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substan-
tive due process concerns . . . until I am faced with [such] a case . . .
I do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analy-
sis.”160 The wisdom in Justice Blackmun’s resistance to foreclosing 
substantive due process as a possible alternative standard in analyz-
ing use of force cases is evident when dealing with cases of deadly 
force where the need for such force presents a “close call.” In these 
cases, the competing interests between deferring to police officers’ 
judgments in tense, uncertain situations that may present grave dan-
ger to them and the public on one hand and the fundamental right all 
individuals possess in their own lives on the other makes assignment 
of liability a difficult query that must account for both these interests. 
In such cases, the “objective reasonableness” standard simply does 
not adequately account for the later interest. Application of the sub-
stantive due process standard posed by Judge Friendly provides a 
more balanced perspective than the “objective reasonableness” lens 
and goes much further in accounting for the individual’s fundamental 
interest in their own life, regardless of the ultimate outcome.
As the Court announced in Rochin, a due process analysis re-
quires, “exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceed-
ings . . . in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
offenses.”161 While this requirement has traditionally been applied to 
procedural due process (e.g., procedures used in criminal cases must 
be fair), substantive due process seeks to apply these same “canons 
of decency and fairness” to the application and enforcement of laws 
to ensure they respect fundamental individual liberties. The Court has 
further announced that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is meant, at a minimum, to “focus . . . on the processes 
160. Graham, 490 U.S. at 400.
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by which life, liberty, or property is taken,”162 and that heightened scru-
tiny is to be applied to those individual rights that are “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”163
Upon this backdrop, as Justice White announced in Tennessee 
v. Garner, it should go without saying that Michael Brown had a fun-
damental right to his own life.164 That right deserves heightened scru-
tiny against adverse application of law. Of course, an individual’s right 
to life, or any other fundamental right, is not absolute. If by his own 
actions, Brown took away any practical choice Officer Wilson had to 
use anything other than deadly force to protect himself or others, then 
liability would not and should not attach. The ultimate determination 
of what happened and whether deadly force was utilized as an unfor-
tunate but necessary final option will be decided by those noble 
twelve tasked with finding truth amongst the competing evidence mar-
shaled by the parties.
However, if the right to life is fundamental, as Justice White sug-
gests, canons of decency and fairness must attach to the processes 
by which that right is deprived. By using an “objective reasonable-
ness” perspective to govern the police’s use of deadly force, with its 
wide grant of deference to police’s determination of when circum-
stances make the use of such force reasonable, heightened scrutiny 
has not been afforded to the individual’s right to life. As this paper 
seeks to show, the “objective reasonableness” standard announced 
by the Supreme Court in Graham is inadequate in close cases involv-
ing police use of deadly force and results in an imbalance wherein the 
deference granted to police judgment in the application of force con-
sumes the inherent interest an individual possesses in their own life. 
This imbalance feeds into the public perception that certain lives 
simply do not matter in the eyes of the law. Changing the lens with 
which police use of deadly force is evaluated would lead to a vastly 
different societal perception of how application of law correlates with 
substantive notions of justice, fairness and equality.
Even policing agencies seem to recognize that use of deadly 
force and the standards governing it need to be reevaluated to pre-
vent unnecessary loss of life. This is evidenced by the widespread 
investment and implementation by police agencies across the nation 
162. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 186 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
12 JACOB FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:26 AM
358 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
in less-lethal force technology such as Tasers, beanbag projectiles, 
pepper spray, and stun grenades.165 Police agencies’ investment in 
less-lethal force technology has expanded in the past several years 
in light of statistical studies debunking traditionalist arguments that 
reliance on less-lethal force may result in more officer related injuries 
due to aggressive resistance by suspects not fearing less-lethal 
force.166 In the wake of the Brown shooting and other similar contem-
porary cases, police have begun having officers wear cameras at-
tached to their uniforms to provide more transparency in police tactics 
generally and use of force scenarios specifically.167 Police have also 
recently begun experimenting with casings to place on the muzzle of 
standard issue police sidearms that make the first ordinary round fired
from an officer’s service weapon a less-lethal round.168
A less deferential standard of review of deadly force cases would 
likely continue to encourage police agencies individually and the De-
partment of Justice collectively to support further research and invest-
ment into less-lethal force technologies and related training programs.
CONCLUSION
Given the social unrest surrounding cases like that of Michael 
Brown and the realization in policing that things may need to change, 
it is time for the Court to catch up. Complete reliance on the “objective 
reasonableness” standard with its deferential posture toward police 
judgments in deadly force cases is outmoded and does not afford 
proper respect for the sanctity of human life by asking if there is any-
thing that could be done differently to avoid the loss of life. While the 
165. See, e.g., Less-Lethal Technologies, JUSTNET,
https://www.justnet.org/less_lethal_tech/index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
166. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER
LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS 7–8 (2011); Phillip Bulman, Police Use of Force: The Impact of Less-
Lethal Weapons and Tactics, NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 4, 4–5 (2011).
167. See, e.g., William Cummings, Ferguson Police Begin Using Body Cameras, USA
TODAY (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/01/ferguson-po-
lice-cameras/14920587/; Rory Carroll, California Police Use of Body Cameras Cuts Violence 
and Complaints, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/california-police-body-cameras-cuts-violence-
complaints-rialto.
168. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Ferguson, Mo., Police Begin Testing New ‘Less-Lethal’ At-
tachment for Guns, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fergu-
son-mo-police-department-is-first-in-us-to-test-less-lethal-gun-
attachment/2015/02/03/c6772af8-abb7-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html; Aaron Smith, 






      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 187 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
12 JACOB FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:26 AM
2016] POLICE LIABILITY 359
Fourth Amendment may very well be the appropriate vehicle for eval-
uating claims of non-deadly force, it should not be the sole constitu-
tional avenue for challenging police use of deadly force.
The sociological impact of a mostly white court telling a mostly 
black population in a low-income, urban setting policed by mostly 
white police officers that a white cop shooting an unarmed black teen-
ager to death was “objectively reasonable” is enormous, regardless 
of its factual accuracy. If, however, the same court allows a jury of the 
deceased’s peers to carefully examine the totality of the circum-
stances and asks the basic question, “Wasn’t there anything else that 
could’ve been done?”, to which the answer is, “No,” it seems that may 
be a much easier pill to swallow. The communities most directly af-
fected by these decisions would have an outlet for their grievances 
and an avenue for true accountability. It may very well follow that the 
disconnect and discord between the members of those communities 
like Ferguson and the boots on the ground policing them would begin 
to be mended.
Returning to the question of responsibility, at the end of the day, 
who is responsible for the death of Michael Brown . . . ? We may never 
know for sure. But we do know what questions ought to be asked, and 
that is all any of us can really ask for.
In addressing the country after the decision was made by the 
Missouri Grand Jury not to indict Officer Wilson, President Obama 
offered the following account of race relations in America:
We need to recognize that this is not just an issue for Ferguson, 
this is an issue for America. We have made enormous progress in 
race relations over the course of the past several decades. I’ve wit-
nesses that in my own life. And to deny that progress I think is to 
deny America’s capacity for change.
But what is also true is that there are still problems and communities 
of color aren’t just making these problems up. Separating that from 
this particular decision, there are issues in which the law too often 
feels as if it is being applied in discriminatory fashion. I don’t think 
that’s the norm. I don’t think that’s true for the majority of communi-
ties or the vast majority of law enforcement officials. But these are 
real issues. And we have to lift them up and not deny them or try to 
tamp them down. What we need to do is to understand them and 
figure out how do we make more progress. And that can be 
done.169
169. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Announcement of the Deci-
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Setting aside any political agenda, there appears to be great wis-
dom and truth in these words. While the solution to this very serious 
and age old problem is not obvious or simple, I would suggest that 
this modification in the application of a law meant to protect the civil 
rights of all Americans is an appropriate and necessary step in the 
right direction. While this would admittedly be a very modest measure 
at tackling an issue that our country has grappled with since its incep-
tion, as the age old proverb suggests, a journey of a thousand miles 
begins with a single step.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/24/remarks-president-after-announce-
ment-decision-grand-jury-ferguson-missou).
